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The ABC's of Universal Service:
Arbitrage, Big Bucks, and

Competitiont
by
GREGORY

L. ROSSTON* AND BRADLEY S. WIMMER**

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("the Act")' forces
regulators to take into account the effect their social policies have on
the development of competition and how the competitive entry the
Act allows will lead to an unraveling of universal service programs
based on implicit cross subsidies. Historically, regulators have used a
variety of implicit and explicit subsidies to keep local residential,
especially rural, rates at regulator-determined "reasonable" levels.2
Regulators used cross subsidies to keep monthly residential rates
low by increasing rates for many services (e.g., long distance calls and
business rates) to levels that exceeded costs. These excessive

I Since the writing of this article the FCC and the courts have issued additional
rulings that affect the details of the regulations discussed in this article. The general
analysis and conclusions drawn about the effects universal service may have on the
development of competition, however, are largely unaffected by these additional
developments.
* Deputy Director and Research Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy
Research, Stanford University. The author would like to thank the Markle Foundation
for funding this research.
** Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-230, §110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 151 et seq.) [hereinafter "The Act" or "The 1996 Act"].
2. The FCC notes that "[tihe urban-to-rural subsidy has been accomplished through
the explicit high cost fund mentioned above, and through geographic rate averaging. The
result of state requirements that local telephone rates be averaged across the state is that
high-density (urban) areas, where costs are typically lower, subsidize low-density (rural)
areas. State pricing rules have also in many cases created a business-to-residential subsidy.
Most states have established local rate levels such that businesses pay more on a per-line
basis for basic local service than do residential customers, although the costs of providing
business and residential lines are generally the same." Federal-State Joint Board on
Universal Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776, 7 Comm Reg. (P&F) 109, para. 11 (1997) (Report
and Order) [hereinafter UniversalService Order].
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revenues were used to offset the difference between the cost and
prices for monthly residential service. These economically inefficient
policies were justified as a means to ensure "universal service." 3 Over
time, universal service policies affected nearly every aspect of
telecommunications regulation.
While economically inefficient, these policies were sustainable
under a regime of regulated monopoly where entry was either very
difficult or prohibited. Because the Act allows entry into local
markets, the presence of economically irrational prices is not
sustainable. New entrants have the incentive to enter markets where
excessive prices are used to subsidize low-priced residential services.
As entry begins to eat away at the implicit subsidies, prices will be
forced to move towards costs.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 recognizes the effect
competition will have on the current system and requires regulators
to overhaul it. In implementing necessary changes, regulators should
consider how competitive firms respond to incentives. The path
regulators are marching down to transform universal service,
however, contains many problems that create artificial incentives that
will cause firms to waste money and do not necessarily reward firms
that best serve consumers.
The problems are inherent in the regulators' methods for
collecting and distributing funds for universal service programs. The
majority of these problems stem from attempts to create artificial
regulatory and jurisdictional distinctions and will only disappear when
regulators and politicians realize that efficiency and consumers are
better served in a competitive environment by an economically
rational system of transparent subsidies, rather than the web implicit
cross subsidies.
I. Universal Service Policy Harms Efficiency and Competition
The Act embraces the idea of competition to ensure the
provision of telecommunication services to consumers. While the
ultimate goal is stated as letting market forces determine market

3. Mueller argues that the causation goes the other way-that "universal service"
started out as moniker for one system serving everyone. Then, at the time of competitive
challenge to the Bell system, universal service became the catchword to prevent
competitive entry. M. MEULLER, UNIVERSAL SERVICE, INTERCONNECTION AND
MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM (1997). We do not

disagree with this position, but rather are concerned with the inextricable linkage between
universal service and competition.
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outcomes, the Act also requires regulators to develop an explicit
universal service program.4 Efficient markets will drive prices toward
costs, but the Act attempts to maintain the current practice of
keeping rates below cost to consumers who live in high-cost areas,
even if these customers can afford to pay rates consistent with costs.
As a result, competition in rural areas will not develop unless
subsidies are made available to all carriers or prices increase to reflect
costs. Competitive markets generally provide goods and services
efficiently. However, regulatory rules that hold prices at levels that
do not reflect costs distort providers' incentives in ways that lead to
inefficient outcomes.
Unfortunately, many aspects of current
universal service programs unnecessarily distort providers' decisions
and adversely affect the development of competition.
There are a variety of universal service programs - federal, state,
high cost, low income, schools and libraries, and rural health care.
These schemes will not necessarily result in competitive distortions as
long as no provider or customer can escape the tax, the tax rate is the
same for all providers, and the money is distributed in a nondiscriminatory manner. Telecommunications regulation is, however,
based on economically meaningless distinctions between interstate
and intrastate services that have been extended to the
implementation of universal service. In addition, the rapid pace of
technological
change
blurs
the
distinction
between
telecommunication services and other advanced services, such as
high-speed data and video transmissions. These factors, combined
with the emergence of new services that will be bundled with
traditional voice services, make defining telecommunication services
difficult.
Universal service programs, as currently structured, rely on
arbitrary definitions to determine which providers will be taxed, how
much they will be taxed, and which ones are eligible for support. As a
result, universal service programs not only distort consumer behavior
by artificially raising prices but alter firms' actions so they can either
avoid taxes or to gain access to subsidies. These latter distortions
affect the development of competition.
The competitive impact of these distortions depends on the size
of the programs. As the universal service programs grow, firms will
4. Congress sought to establish a "pro-competitive, deregulatory national policy
framework." S. Conf. Rep. No. 104-230, at 1 (1996) ("Joint Explanatory Statement").
Explicit subsidies for universal service programs are discussed in the Act at 47 U.S.C. §
254(e).
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devote more resources to avoid paying the increased charges to fund
the system. This avoidance activity is non-productive and, in some
cases, may be achieved by simply repositioning or renaming a service,
which creates no additional value. Taking advantage of these
regulatory anomalies is not free. Considerable resources must be
dedicated to identify and understand the anomalies. Additionally,
more than an insignificant amount of resources are needed to
implement changes. These activities can only hurt consumers because
providers base decisions, in part, on regulatory rules rather than on a
desire to serve consumers. Finally, particular firms may gain an
artificial competitive advantage simply because they are better
positioned than others to avoid a tax or gain a subsidy. The end
result is that providers may win customers because of their ability to
use regulations advantageously rather than their ability to provide
services efficiently.
A rational universal service policy would minimize these
distortions while achieving clear, well-articulated goals.5 The policy
should ensure that all competitors incur the same tax and that the
incentives for tax avoidance are small. This can be done by making
avoidance expensive and difficult, having a small tax, or by
eliminating the tax on telecommunications altogether. We believe
that making avoidance expensive and difficult is much more costly
than making the tax small. 6 The fast pace of technological change and
the ability of firms to respond to incentives makes it very difficult, if
not impossible, to develop rules that withstand the dynamics of the
market. Additionally, it is difficult to overestimate the creativity of
firms attempting to avoid taxes on narrowly defined services.
U. Jurisdictional Arbitrage
Most of the behavior discussed above can be categorized as
"arbitrage." As economists, we consider arbitrage to be a good thing
in most cases. Arbitrage facilitates the workings of markets by driving
prices to cost and equilibrating supply and demand. In a competitive
market, arbitrage opportunities are short-lived because profit5. We argue in an earlier paper, The High Cost of UniversalService, that the goals of
universal service programs are not clear. This paper does not argue about the unclear
goals, but rather the inefficiency in achieving the outcomes, whatever they may be. See
Gregory L. Rosston and Bradley S. Wimmer, The High Cost of Universal Service, in CCH
POWER AND TELECOM LAW (January/February 1999).

6. We discuss later the best answer-a general revenue tax to support whatever system
is in place. But the political reality is that transition to such an explicit, visible system
would be sure to face stiff opposition from those who benefit from the current largess.
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maximizing entities move quickly to take advantage of any price
differentials or arbitrage opportunities.
When arbitrage is driven by artificially imposed differences,
however, it can have pernicious effects. In the case of universal
service, it is clear that artificial distortions exist and will create shortrun, and possibly long-run, inefficiencies. If these inefficiencies are
severe enough to threaten the universal service program, a reworking of the system may come sooner rather than later. This,
however, is unlikely. In the past, when arbitrage opportunities have
arisen in other areas, the FCC and state regulators have simply solved
the most pressing symptoms while allowing the underlying problems
to persist. Just recently, the FCC ruled that internet traffic should be
considered "interstate. '7 It appears that this was done to remove
internet traffic from reciprocal compensation rules for the exchange
of local traffic.8 This is obviously a short-term fix that did not address
the basic problems of regulating the interconnection of separate
networks. The FCC merely put a band-aid on the most pressing and
politically obvious symptom of the underlying problem. Just as this
will not solve the long-run competitive interconnection situation,
solutions to the universal service problems are likely to be band-aids
that cover up visible problems and do not address the entire set of
universal service problems. The political process generally does not
respond to arbitrage opportunities by correcting the underlying
problem. Rather, regulators typically adopt incremental changes to
their rules that prevent obvious arbitrage opportunities that often
exacerbate underlying problems.
A basic underlying problem of universal service is the dual
jurisdictional nature of telecommunications regulation. This dual
jurisdictional regime has resulted in regulators fighting over who will
set the prices and who will assume responsibility to ensure that
carriers recover their costs. 9 Eventually, if and when competition
7. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996: Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic. See Declaratory Ruling
in CC Docket No. 96-98 and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 99-68, 14
F.C.C.R. 3689,17 Comm. Reg. (P&F) 201 (1999).
8. The FCC goes to great strides to clarify that its ruling does not affect state rules or
jurisdiction, or existing interconnection agreements. Id. at 26.
The Act states that reciprocal compensation applies to "transport and termination of
telecommunications." 47 U.S.C. § 251(a)(5). While the majority of internet traffic may be
"interstate" in nature, whether a transmission crosses state lines has nothing to do with the
cost of providing access to a network, so the distinction itself is meaningless.
9. This is most recently and perhaps best exemplified by the state regulators'
challenge to the FCC assertion of jurisdictional authority in implementing the
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develops and regulations are relaxed, these jurisdictional battles will
end. However, battles over how universal service subsidies are
funded and distributed are likely to persist as long as the program
exists.
A. History

Jurisdictional tensions have been present since the beginning of
telephone regulation. Much of telephone regulation and associated
legal precedent comes directly from railroad regulation. 10 Soon after
the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 gave the ICC power to regulate
interstate telecommunications, the Supreme Court, in the Shreveport
Rate Case, gave the ICC significant power compared to state
regulatory commissions." The Shreveport Rate Case gave the ICC,
which clearly had power over interstate rates, the opening to set
intrastate rates ostensibly to eliminate discriminatory pricing
practices. This pattern of federal dominance held until Smith vs.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co. in 1930.12 In Smith v. Illinois Bell, the Court held
that even though the same plant and equipment were used to provide
both interstate and intrastate communications, regulators had to
implement rules that apportion the costs of service to each
13
jurisdiction.
Soon after the Smith v. Illinois Bell decision, Congress passed the
Telecommunications Act of 193414 ("1934 Act") which, among other
things, created the Federal Communications Commission. Much of
the 1934 Act was copied wholesale from the Interstate Commerce
Act of 1888 so that precedents based on ICC railroad regulation
applied to FCC telephone regulation. 15 However, section 152 of the
1934 Act explicitly states that the FCC does not have authority over

Telecommunications Act of 1996. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
10. In fact, under the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, the Interstate Commerce Commission
had federal regulatory authority over telecommunications from 1910 until the passage of

the Telecommunications Act of 1934. See Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539

(1910).

11. Houston, East & West Texas Ry. Co., v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)

("Shreveport Rate Case").
12. 282 U.S. 133 (1930) ("Smith v. IllinoisBell").

13. See icL at 148-52.
14. Communications Act of 1934,48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
15. "Most of the Act's provisions dealing with telecommunications were drawn
directly from the Interstate Commerce Act, though the new commission was given some

new powers to regulate tariffs and services." MICHAEL K. KELLOG ET AL., FEDERAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW (Peter W. Huber et al. eds., 1992).
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rates for intrastate communications. 16 Presumably this was done to
remove any doubt that the Shreveport Rate Case did not give the FCC

power over intrastate rates.
Even thought the 1934 Act ostensibly separated the federal and

state jurisdictions, the nature of telecommunications service is such
that it is impossible to separate the two services. As a result, the
tension between federal and state regulators has continued unabated.
These jurisdictional battles have typically resulted in compromises

and pricing policies based on social goals rather than an analysis of
economic implications. For example, during the divestiture of AT&T
and the implementation of access charges and separations, some

parties believed that the cross subsidy of local rates by long distance
7
calls should remain in place.'
In conjunction with the breakup of AT&T, the FCC (and states)
instituted a regime of "access" charges. These charges were put in
place to continue the interstate (and intrastate long distance)
contribution to cover non-traffic sensitive loop costs as well as to
cover the incremental costs of providing the switching services to
provide long distance access. To implement access charges, the FCC
and a Federal-State Joint Board determined, quite arbitrarily, that
twenty-five percent of all the costs associated with connecting a
consumer to the network - loop costs - be recovered through federal

charges.' 8 The FCC favored use of flat-rated charges because loop

16. 47 U.S.C. §152(b).
17. Federal Communications Commissioner Anne Jones' 1983 dissent from the Joint
Board's access charge and separations plan shows that the issues associated with universal
service and separation of costs are not new. In fact, Commissioner Jones' statement
appears to be frighteningly relevant to current issues.
It is not clear to me that the Joint Board's recommendations can in any event be
more than a temporary benefit to either high-cost telephone companies or their
regulators. The days are numbered for regulators who believe they can mandate
economically irrational behavior in the telephone industry. It is unrealistic to
persist in the belief that dynamic telecommunications markets will adjust to a
regulator's transitional timetable to preserve "equities" among affected market
participants. "Equity"-driven policies may be sustainable in a slow growth, static
technology industry. They are not simply viable in a dynamic growth industry
such as telecommunications. Consequently, I fear that neither high-cost
companies nor their state regulators will find the Joint Board's recommendations
a solution to their respective financial and political ills. I am sure consumers will
not.
Federal-State Joint Board on Jurisdictional Separations Procedures, Amendment of Part
67 of the Commission's Rules and Establishment of a Joint Board, CC Docket 80-286, 48
F.R. 46556, 46656-02, 46588 (1983) (dissenting Statement of Commissioner Anne P.
Jones).
18. The first separations manual was put forth in 1947. A series of decisions over the
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costs are not sensitive to the amount of usage. 19 Consumer advocates
and rural Senators lobbied heavily to keep cross subsidies from highvolume users to low-volume users hidden and opposed
implementation of federal flat-rated charges (subscriber line charges
or "SLCs"). 2° These flat-rated charges ultimately removed part of the
inefficient recovery of loop costs.
B. Economic Considerations

While there is tension about how costs should be allocated
between jurisdictions, because there is no economically meaningful
distinction between interstate and intrastate services, the common
costs to provide these services cannot be allocated in a non-arbitrary
way. Because both interstate and intrastate calls travel over the same
facilities, economies of scope exist in the provision of these services.
This means that a significant amount of costs are "common" to the
provision of these services.

Common costs cannot be divided

between the jurisdictions in any economically rational way. As a
result, because each set of regulators wants to maintain low prices for
the services in their jurisdictions, each want services that are subject

to another jurisdiction to pay for the common costs.
Most parties agree that per minute access charges are above cost.
Incumbent local exchange providers argue that these are necessary to
fund below cost services whereas long-distance carriers claim that
these are the source of excess profits. In either case, there are some

customers who pay more than their costs to serve them and other
customers who pay less than their cost of service. As a result, there is
next 30 years increased the interstate share of fixed loop costs to 25% or more. See G.
BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION AGE: FROM
MONOPOLY TO COMPETITION, ch. 5 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994);

Mueller, supranote 3.
19. For a thorough discussion of the politics and interest groups involved and their
positions on a wide variety of restructuring issues, see BROCK, supranote 18, at chs. 10-11.
20. The FCC used a variety of rates to recover its "share" of local telephone plant
costs, the majority of which is not traffic sensitive. These included subscriber line charges
(SLCs), which are used to recover a portion of loop costs, and a variety of other perminute charges and per-line taxes on long-distance carriers. Because of political pressures,
the FCC was forced to "cap" SLCs at levels below total non-traffic-sensitive costs.
Residential SLCs were initially capped at $3.50, while SLCs for business lines were capped
at $6.00. Because SLCs were artificially capped, per-minute interstate access charges were
set at rates that exceeded traffic-sensitive costs, which artificially increased the price of
long-distance calls. Recently, the FCC has implemented some major changes to its
interstate access charges including a relaxation of its caps on SLCs. Caps on non-primary,
or secondary, residential line SLCs are now allowed to be as high as $6.07 and business
lines SLC caps have been increased to $9.20.
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at least some implicit intra-company cross subsidy taking place that
may be affected by the introduction of competition.
Regulatory distortions have been the cause of inefficient
behavior throughout the history of telecommunications regulation.
Inflated access charges paved the way for entry by competitive access
providers that bypassed local providers, connecting them directly to
long distance carriers.2 ' These arrangements allowed large customers
to avoid artificially high access charges. Moreover, incumbent local
providers had difficulty passing regulatory hurdles to begin offering
new services to compete with competitive providers. 22 Access charges
are still above cost in most areas of the country, although the FCC has
taken steps to move these closer to cost in the near future by changes
in price structures and price-cap reductions. 23 As competition
flexibilities that
develops, the FCC has proposed a variety of pricing
24
may also result in reduced or more efficient rates.
States also have a variety of charges that have been used as
implicit subsidies for universal service.25 These charges took similar
forms - geographically averaged connection charges, inflated perminute access charges and inflated fees for services such as call
waiting. The rates for these charges generally differed from the
federal rates.
C. Distortionary Effects

In the absence of competition, there is little or no ability for
customers of regulated incumbents to substitute, or arbitrage, flatrated monthly state or federal charges because all lines are assessed
both charges. The differences between interstate and intrastate per21. We note that competitive access providers may have been competitively efficient
and beneficial even without the artificial umbrella of above cost access charges. However,
high access charges provided an additional artificial entry incentive.
22. "We find that requiring an incumbent LEC to file a waiver to introduce a new rate
element imposes a costly, time-consuming, and unnecessary burden on incumbent LECs,
and significantly impedes the introduction of new services. Also, we believe that delaying
implementation would not assist in the development of a competitive marketplace."
Access Charge Reform, Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, 7
Comm Reg. (P&F) 1209, para. 309 (1997) (First Report and Order) [hereinafter Access
Reform Order].
23. See Access Reform Order; Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange
Carriers, Fourth Report and Order in CC Docket 94-1 and Second Report and Order in
CC Docket No. 96-262, FCC 97-159, 12 F.C.C.R. 16642 (1997) [hereinafter Price Cap
Performance Review].
24. See Access Reform Order;PriceCap PerformanceReview.
25. See R. CRANDALL AND L. WAvERMAN, TALK IS CHEAP: THE PROMISE OF
REGULATORY REFORM IN NORTH AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1995).
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minute access charges provided carriers an opportunity to bypass the
local network or to misreport whether a long-distance call has crossed
state lines or not. For example, until recently, intrastate access
charges in Maine were about 26 cents per minute while the interstate

access charges were about 7 cents per minute.2 6 As a result, longdistance carriers had an incentive to report intrastate calls as
interstate calls.27 While the local carrier performs the same services

for both types of calls, access charges in Maine differed by a factor of
more than 3.
The total universal service program consists of several federal
and state programs. Regulators controlling the programs have
different goals and constituencies and, as a result, often develop
inconsistent policies. The Telecommunications Act requires universal
service subsidies be made explicit. 28 Even if subsidies were made
explicit-which has yet to happen-jurisdictional arbitrage
opportunities remain.
In the Act's universal service program, Congress required the

FCC to begin a new program that provides subsidies to schools,
libraries, and rural hospitals. 29 While the FCC determined it had the
authority to tax all telecommunication revenues for all of its
programs, it concluded, with some help from the Joint Board, that it
was on safer legal ground by limiting its high-cost revenue base to
interstate revenues. 30 The FCC determined, however, that the tax to

support schools and libraries should be assessed on both interstate
and intrastate revenues. 31 This created a difference in tax rates for
26. New England Telephone and Telegraph Company, 185 P.U.R. 4th 177 (1998)
(Order of the Maine Public Utilities Commission in the Investigation into Regulatory
Alternatives for NYNEX, Docket No. 94-123).
27. Long distance calls within the state of Maine are all intra LATA toll calls because
the state consists of a single LATA.
28. 47 U.S.C. § 254(e).
29. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(1)(A) discusses the provisions for Health Care providers for
rural areas. §254(h)(1)(B) discusses the provisions for educational providers and libraries.
30. "The Joint Board makes no recommendation concerning the appropriate funding
base for the modified high cost and low income assistance programs, but does request that
the Commission seek additional information and parties' comment, particularly the states,
regarding the assessment method for these programs." Federal-State Joint Board on
Universal Service, 12 FCC Rcd 87, para 817, 5 Comm. Reg. (P&F) 1 (1996)
(recommended decision) [hereinafter Universal Service Recommended Decision]. The
FCC responded to this "[b]ecause the Joint Board did not recommend an interstate and
intrastate assessment base for high cost and low-income programs, for now we will assess
the support for these programs solely from contributors' interstate end-use
telecommunications revenues." UniversalService Order,para. 772.
31. The Joint Board recommended "that universal service support mechanisms for
schools and libraries and rural health care providers be funded by assess both the
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interstate and intrastate services. In the second quarter of 1999, the
Federal universal service taxes are 3.05 percent on interstate revenues

and an additional 0.57 percent on all revenues. 32 Furthermore, the
Commission limited incumbent local carriers' ability to recover these
new charges by requiring them to recover their "contributions"
through increased per-minute interstate access charges. 33 Thus, as the

Commission took great strides to reduce the implicit subsidies buried
in access charges, it replaced the majority, if not all, of these

reductions with universal-service charges.
In addition to the differences in the tax rates and distortions
caused by the federal taxes, states are in the process of implementing
their own programs. For example, the Kansas Commission has
implemented its state universal service program, which it estimates
will total $111.6 million annually once it is phased in fully over a
period of three years.34 The Kansas Commission determined that it
would tax all intrastate retail revenues on the same percentage basis,
reaching an estimated 14.1 percent at the end of three years. 35 This

will result in an increase in local rates of approximately $3 per
36

month.
When combined with the federal programs, universal service
taxes on intrastate revenues may be greater or less than the rates on
interstate revenues. Moreover, because each state will have its own

program, the differentials will not be the same across states. For
states with a high tax rate, carriers have the incentive to move
revenues to the interstate jurisdiction. Such shifting could cause a

downward spiral in its tax base. As the rate base dwindles, the tax
rate will have to increase, which, in turn, will further increase
incentives to move revenues. It is not clear whether high-cost states
intrastate and interstate revenues of providers of interstate telecommunications services."
Universal Service Recommended Decision. The FCC adopted the combined revenue
recommendation for schools, libraries and rural health care providers. "We adopt the
Joint Board's recommendation that a carrier's contribution to support for eligible schools,
libraries, and health care providers be assessed based on contributors' interstate and
intrastate telecommunications revenues." UniversalService Order,para. 772.
32. See Proposed Second Quarter 1999 Universal Service Contribution Factors, CC
Docket 96-45,14 F.C.C.R. 5072 (1999) (Public Notice).
33. UniversalService Order,para. 773.
34. In the Matter of a General Investigation Into Competition within the
Telecommunications Industry in the State of Kansas Docket No. 190, 492-U, 94-GIMT478-GIT, paras. 111-12 (1996) (Order Establishing the Guidelines for the Local Telephone
Exchange Service in Kansas and Incorporating the State Telecommunications Act of
1996).
35. See id.
36. See id.
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recognized this problem when they argued against the FCC taxing
both revenue streams. If they had, and federal programs taxed all
revenues equally, each state could then argue that it be allowed to tax
both revenue streams. Jurisdictional arbitrage opportunities would
have been eliminated because tax rates would be identical 37
These rules, coupled with strict regulation of incumbent local
exchange carriers, alter the nature of competition. For example,
incumbent local exchange providers are required to charge certain
monthly fees, e.g., subscriber line charges, that are categorized as
interstate charges. These charges are therefore subjected to the
interstate tax rate. Incumbent carriers can only recover these
increased costs through increases in access charges. 38 Competitive
local exchange carriers are not regulated and have more leeway to
classify a charge as interstate or intrastate. 39 Thus, if the interstate tax
rate is higher, competitive carriers will determine that their flat-rated
charges are intrastate charges and avoid the higher tax rate. If the
tax-rate differential is high enough, customers may pick a competitive
carrier over an incumbent carrier simply because the competitor is
better able to shift revenue, not because it is a better provider.
37. It should be noted that the opportunity would not be eliminated to the extent that
consumers can shift their purchases to other states. For example, a large corporation
could shift purchases so even though they buy service in state A, they pay for service in
state B. An example might be that a corporation could purchase wireless service from
AT&T in the lowest cost state and since charges do not vary by location of the call, no tax
would be due in the state where the service is used. As of right now, this is probably fairly
minor occurrence, but could increase with changes in technology and with an increase in
tax rates.
38. See Access Reform Order,which provides:
Price cap LECs may treat their contributions to the new universal service
mechanisms, including high cost and low-income support and support for eligible
schools, libraries, and health care, as exogenous changes to their price cap indices
(PCIs). Because the only interstate revenues that will serve as the basis for
assessing universal service contributions in 1998 will be end-user revenues, we
find that price cap LECs recovering their universal service obligation through
interstate access charges must recover those contributions in the baskets for
services that generate end-user interstate revenues.
dL, para. 379 (footnote omitted).
39. See "Prospectus" for Rhythms Net Connections, Inc., p. 18, March 16, 1999
("Telecommunications providers pay a variety of surcharges and fees on their gross
revenues from interstate and intrastate services. The division of our services between
interstate and intrastate services is a matter of interpretation, and in the future the Federal
Communications Commission or relevant state commission authorities may contest this
division. A change in the characterization of the jurisdiction of our services could cause
our payment obligations to increase. In addition, pursuant to periodic revisions by state
and federal regulators of the applicable surcharges, we may be subject to increase in the
surcharges and fees currently paid.").
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Encouraging this behavior is inefficient.
While such price differentials will not be competitively neutral, a

larger problem may come from regulators' attempts to correct
problems of revenue shifting by increasing new entrant's regulatory
burden. There is a long and storied history of cost allocation for
regulated incumbent local exchange providers. 4 Regulators require
incumbents to keep excruciatingly detailed cost allocation manuals
subjecting these carriers to detailed rules about how to account for
different costs and revenues. 41 So far, new entrants have escaped
such detailed regulatory scrutiny. If, however, large differences in tax

rates persist, competitive providers will tailor their offerings to avoid
the taxes and regulators may subject these carriers to similarly
intrusive regulations, even though it is not clear what will be gained
from such requirements.
There is already evidence of revenue shifting on the part of
unregulated entities. When the FCC moved to its new revenue tax to

fund universal service, there was evidence that many wireless carriers
were under-reporting the amount of revenues they received from
interstate calling. 42 This under-reporting may simply be a result of
competitive carriers' unique offerings. For example, packages such as
40. The FCC notes that the dual jurisdictional nature of telecommunications

regulations requires separation of interstate and intrastate costs.
The dual system of regulation reflected in the Communications Act of 1934
requires the separation of common carrier costs and revenues between interstate
and intrastate operations, so that we and the states may each regulate the
provision of communications common carrier services within our respective
jurisdictions.
Separation of Costs of Regulated Telephone Service From Costs of Nonregulated
Activities, CC Docket No. 86-111,2 F.C.C.R. 1298, para. 8 (1987) (Report and Order).
41. The FCC describes cost allocation procedures as follows:
The jurisdictional separations process begins with the costs recorded in the
USOA (uniform system of accounts) accounts. Those costs are first assigned to
categories and subcategories. Each category of costs is then assigned or allocated
in accordance with a prescribed rule or principle. Although the Separations
Manual categories are designed so as to group together those costs which can be

identified as belonging to a single jurisdiction, most of the categories contain
costs which must be allocated between the jurisdictions. Some of the separations
categories are subdivisions of a single USOA account, while others combine costs
which are recorded in several accounts. The Separations Manual is a fully
distributed costing system, which means only that it exhaustively apportions the
costs of a company's regulated operations between the jurisdictions.
Id para. 9 (footnotes omitted).
42. The FCC notes that "some CMRS providers reported seven percent of their
CMRS revenues as interstate, while other reported 28 percent as interstate." Federal-

State Joint Board on Universal Service, CC Docket No. 96-45, 13 F.C.C.R. 21252, para. 10
(1998) (Memorandum Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
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AT&T's "Digital One Rate," where customers pay a single monthly
fee for a set amount of minutes, make arbitrary allocation procedures
difficult because such plans do not differentiate between interstate
and intrastate minutes. The possible under-reporting led the FCC to
seek comment on how to divide wireless (including paging
companies) carriers' revenues. 43 It also set a "safe harbor," equal to 44a
predetermined percentage of total revenues, for carriers to elect.
The safe harbor creates an obvious adverse selection result.
Assuming the interstate tax rate is higher, carriers with high interstate
revenues will choose the safe harbor while those with low interstate
revenues will choose to differentiate the two. Because the
delineation is arbitrary, this could be a move in the right direction. A
better answer might be for the FCC to set a percentage that is
interstate without the possibility of refuting it.
Artificially categorizing services and costs as interstate or
intrastate, while always arbitrary, has the potential to skew
competitive results and serves little purpose in today's market. The
decisions concerning where to invest in new services, which markets
to enter, and how to develop offerings should be based on market
factors, not regulatory distortions. Regulators should be considering
how to lessen regulatory burdens, rather than extending regulatory
regimes to competitive carriers. While the differences of opinion
between state and federal regulators appear to be large, they should
be cognizant of the effects their jurisdictional squabbles have on
competition and adjust their rules to minimize opportunities for
jurisdictional arbitrage.
D. Geographic De-Averaging

In a competitive market, rates will reflect costs. The universal
service programs intend to prevent the alignment of rates and costs.
Because telephone costs are inversely related to population density,
movement of rates towards costs would result in large rate increases
in rural areas and reductions in dense areas.45 Historically, regulators,
43. See id.
44. The FCC established a "safe harbor percentage of interstate revenues for cellular
and broadband PCS telecommunications revenue. The Commission will, therefore, not
seek supporting data from cellular and broadband PCS telecommunications revenues if
they report at least 15 percent of their cellular and broadband PCS telecommunications
revenue as interstate." Id. para. 13. The FCC set lower percentages for paging and SMR
providers. See id.
45. In dense areas, larger switches and shorter loops result in relatively lower costs
than in areas of low population density. Other factors, such as increased sharing of
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in addition to other implicit subsidies, relied on geographically
averaged rates to hold rates down in high-cost areas.4 6 In some states,
regulators depart further from efficient pricing and rely on "valuebased pricing," where prices are inversely related to the number of
people located in customers' calling areas. This results in prices that
are inversely related to the cost of providing service, which is

inconsistent with economic efficiency.
The new universal service program attempts to give carriers

incentives that are consistent with cost-based de-averaged rates
without making consumers pay higher prices for local service.
Regulators plan to base support on cost-model estimates of the
average economic cost of serving customers within small geographic
areas.47 Under this plan, carriers serving high-cost customers will
receive payments (revenues plus subsidies) that should equal cost. It
is therefore arguable that the new universal service program gets half

of the equation right. If support truly reflects the revenue necessary
to induce a carrier to provide services, carrier choice will be based on
efficiency. 48 However, the price of local service will be held below

cost through the subsidies, which will be collected through a tax on
telecommunication services. Thus, the distortion in prices introduced

by the programs will skew consumer decisions. The benefits of
improved incentives to enter rural markets may be offset by the
inefficiencies associated with high tax rates.
The use of a highly geographic-specific support mechanism may
facilities in dense areas, and the need to use additional electronics to transmit signals over
long distances in rural areas result in relatively lower costs in dense areas.
46. The FCC notes that "[t]he urban-to-rural subsidy has been accomplished through
the explicit high cost fund mentioned above, and through geographic rate averaging. The
result of state requirements that local telephone rates be averaged across the state is that
high-density (urban) areas, where costs are typically lower, subsidize low-density (rural)
areas. State pricing rules have also in many cases created a business-to-residential subsidy.
Most states have established local rate levels such that businesses pay more on a per-line
basis for basic local service than do residential customers, although the costs of providing
business and residential lines are generally the same." UniversalService Order,para. 11.
47. The FCC has adopted a platform-the basic set of algorithms-that will be used to
estimate the forward-looking economic cost of providing voice-grade phone services,
which will be used to determine the amount of subsidies received by non-rural, i.e. carriers
with more than 100,000 lines in a service area. The FCC is currently working on finetuning the model and determining the input values that will be input into the platform.
The FCC intends to estimate the average cost of serving a customer within each wire
center, which is simply the customers served by the same switch. See In the Matter of
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Forward-Looking Cost Support for High
Cost Support for Non-Rural LECs, 13 F.C.C.R. 21323, para. 12, (1998) (Fifth Report and
Order).
48. This result assumes that all carriers are eligible to receive support payments.
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create additional arbitrage problems because of other inconsistent
regulations. In the Local Competition order, the FCC required states
49
to de-average unbundled element prices into at least three zones.
Historically, regulators have set rates based on statewide averages,
which results in rates that exceed cost in urban areas. If regulators
continue this practice when setting unbundled element prices,
competitors will find it less profitable to enter urban markets using
unbundled elements. Thus far, states and their incumbent carriers
have generally not proposed such de-averaged rates for unbundled
loops. Because the FCC determined that competitors that enter highcost areas using unbundled elements are eligible for universal service
support,50 differences between cost estimates used to set support and
prices of unbundled elements will create arbitrage opportunities.
If unbundled element prices are not de-averaged, universal
service subsidies may exceed the amount necessary to induce a carrier
to provide service using unbundled elements. For example, if
unbundled element prices are based on a statewide average cost of
$15, but support is based on a geographically de-averaged estimate of
$61, arbitrage opportunities will arise. Assume further that support is
equal to estimated cost minus a benchmark of $31. The competitive
carrier would receive a subsidy of $30 and customer revenues of $31,
but only incur costs of $15. 51 Clearly this arbitrage opportunity is
created by the use of geographically averaged unbundled element
prices and skews carrier choice toward the use of unbundled network
elements.
The FCC attempted to address this potential problem by limiting
support to the purchase price of unbundled elements if they are

49. The Commission concluded that
three zones are presumptively sufficient to reflect geographic cost differences in
setting rates for interconnection and unbundled elements, and that states may,
but need not, use these existing density-related rate zones. Where such systems
are not in existence, states shall create a minimum of three cost-related rate
zones to implement de-averaged rates for interconnection and unbundled
elements. A state may establish more than three zones where cost differences in
geographic regions are such that it finds that additional zones are needed to
adequately reflect the costs of interconnection and access to unbundled elements.
Implementation of the Local Competition Provision in the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 11 FCC Rcd 15,499, para. 756, 4 Comm. Reg. (P&F) 1 (1996) (First Report and
Order) [hereinafter Local Competition Order].
50. UniversalService Order,paras. 152-67.
51. For simplicity, this example assumes these are the only costs and revenues. Clearly
the reality is more complex, but the arbitrage point remains the same even when other
factors are considered.
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used. 52 During the transition from the old to the new universal
service program, carriers will continue to receive support based on
statewide geographically averaged embedded costs, while unbundled
element prices are supposed to reflect geographically de-averaged
economic costs. The mismatch of approaches required regulators to
limit support to prevent artificial arbitrage opportunities.
It remains to be seen whether regulators will allow this type of
arbitrage to take place once the new universal service program is put
in place. If states continue to use statewide averaged unbundled
element prices, it may be preferable to allow the arbitrage
opportunity to remain by allowing carriers to receive the full subsidy
regardless of whether or not they deliver service using unbundled
elements. In this case, the potential for arbitrage puts pressure on
states to de-average unbundled element prices, which will help move
prices towards cost and remove the input distortion. Again, the dual
jurisdictional nature of telecommunications regulation makes it very
difficult for state and federal regulators to develop consistent policies,
creating a large amount of regulatory uncertainty.

I. Service Category Arbitrage
A potentially larger problem arises from the legal distinctions
between different services. Historically, regulators have used legal
distinctions to promote different services, customers, or providers. In
doing so, they created not only the intended benefits at the time, but
also incentives for companies and consumers to get around the
artificial distinctions. These incentives are increasingly forcing
regulatory agencies to re-write rules to keep pace with changes in
technology that outdate the artificial distinctions.
A. Information Service vs. Telecom Service

The 1996 Act implicitly distinguishes telecommunication services
from information services. This distinction is important because
telecommunications providers are required to contribute to the
universal service program, and only eligible telecommunication
carriers are eligible to receive support under the program. 53 The
52. UniversalService Order,para. 174.
53. The Act states that "[e]very telecommunications carrier that provides interstate
telecommunications services shall contribute...." 47 U.S.C. § 254(d). Section 254(e)
states that "only an eligible telecommunications carrier designated under section 214(e)
shall be eligible to receive specific federal universal service support." Id.§ 254(e)
(emphasis added).
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distinction between information and telecommunication services is
not new. Since the late 1960's and early 1970's regulators have
struggled with how to regulate information service providers.
Generally, it appears that regulators recognized that their inefficient
regulations, if applied to information services, would choke off the
development of this industry. 54
In its Computer II decision, the FCC created a distinction
between "basic" and "enhanced" services. The decision labeled a
service "enhanced" if it "employ[ed] computer processing
applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar
aspect of the subscriber's transmitted information; ... or involve[d]
subscriber interaction with stored information. '55 Services that did
not meet this definition were generally considered basic services. The
MFJ Court made a similar distinction between "information" and
"telecommunications" services. 56 While these distinctions may seem
substantial, little differences exist between the provision of voice and
advanced services. Technically, a voice signal that is converted to
digital before going through a network is indistinguishable from
computer information that is transmitted over the network.
Transmission of computer information, however, is not considered a
telecommunications service.
These distinctions are important because the FCC determined
that all enhanced services were exempt from its access charge rules
and, in general, were not regulated. 57 The 1996 Act continued this
54. It is unclear whether this argument is about succeeding because it is protecting the
information service industry as it develops or whether it is because it is promoting
efficiency by refusing to extend inefficient regulation. The FCC found in 1988 that it
should continue its exemption of the enhanced service provider industry because it found
that the industry was entering a unique period of rapid expansion and substantial change.
See Amendments of Part 69 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Enhanced Service
Providers, 3 FCC Rcd 2631 (1988) (Order).
55. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a)
56. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), add'd sub nom.
Maryland v. U.S., 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). Section IV(j) discusses information services and
section IV(p) discusses telecommunication services.
57. See Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 417, 47 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 669 (Final
Decision), modified, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 85 FCC 2d 50, 48 Rad. Reg.
(P&F) 1107 (1980), affd and clarified by Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further
Reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d 512, 50 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 629 (1981), affd sub nom.
Computer and Comm. Indus. Ass'n. v. F.C.C., 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983) [hereinafter Computer II]. The interstate access exemption
came in 1983. See MTS and WATS Market Structure, Docket No. 78-72, 97 FCC 2d 682,
711-22 (Memorandum Opinion and Order). See also Amendments of Part 69 of the
Commission's Rules Relating to Enhanced Service Providers, CC Docket No. 87-215, 3
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legal distinction using the terminology of information and
telecommunications services.5 8 In implementing the 1996 Act, the
FCC concluded that Congress intended to extend the FCC's earlier

distinctions between basic and enhanced services and adopted rules
that were basically consistent with its Computer II decision.5 9
In its 1998 Report to Congress, the FCC clarified its definitions
and determined
that information
service providers use
telecommunications to provide their services. 6° This creates some

potential problems, which the FCC recognized in its report. First, the
development of internet protocol (IP) telephony creates a problem.
While the FCC recognizes that the method of delivery is less

important than the service provided, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
craft regulations that create distinctions when the services being
defined are becoming increasingly indistinguishable.
In its 1998 Report, the FCC notes that if a customer uses the IP
for phone-to-phone communications, the service may be considered a
telecommunications service and will be taxed, although the FCC did

not make any definitive judgement based on the record before it.61
The technical equivalence of information services and IT telephony
makes enforcement of such rules all but impossible.
The FCC also noted that because information service providers

use telecommunications

services to transmit information, they

indirectly contribute to universal service. However, the FCC is not

certain how to handle situations where information service providers
furnish their own underlying transmission capacity. It therefore left
open the possibility of imputing the portion of the revenues that
should be included in the universal service tax base when information
FCC Rcd 2631 (1988) (Order).
58. The Act defines "information services" as offering the capability for "generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
information via telecommunications." 47 U.S.C. § 153(20).
59. "For purposes of this order, providers of enhanced services and providers of
information services are referred to as ISPs." Access Reform Order,n.498. "Reading the
statute closely, with attention to the legislative history, we conclude that Congress
intended these new terms to build upon frameworks established prior to the passage of the
1996 Act. Specifically, we find that Congress intended the categories of
"telecommunications service" and information service" to parallel the definitions of "basic
service" and "enhanced service" developed in our Computer 11 proceeding, and the
definitions of "telecommunications" and "information service" developed in the
Modification of Final Judgement breaking up the Bell system." Report to Congress,para.
20.
60. "Internet access, like all information services, is provided 'via
telecommunications."' Report to Congress,para. 67.
61. See id., para. 2.
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service providers self-supply transmission capacity. 62
Rapid technological change is blurring the distinction between
information and telecommunication services. Artificial distinctions
based on whether or not the transmission capacity is leased or owned,
where owned facilities are not taxed, give carriers an artificial
incentive to build rather than lease facilities. Attempts to impute the
portion of revenues that are attributable to underlying capacity are
equally likely to introduce distortions. Distinctions as fine as whether
a call is a phone-to-phone transmission, rather than a computer-tocomputer transmission, are impossible to make.
The use of legal distinctions to determine which services are
subject to the universal service tax creates uncertainty about universal
service's tax base.
Firms that
provide
"interstate
telecommunications" are required to contribute to the universal
service fund. However, in today's world of rapidly changing
technology, even this simple definition is becoming difficult to
implement. Implementation becomes even more complicated when
providers begin offering bundles of services over their own
transmission capacity. Should only revenues derived from simple
voice services be included in the tax base, or should additional
services, such as internet access, over which consumers may
communicate by voice, be included? If the decision is that only
telecommunications service revenues should be taxed, firms that offer
bundles of services, some of which are classified as
telecommunications, have the option of diverting revenues to nontelecommunication services. For example, AT&T, with its recent
acquisition of TCI, has an incentive to provide free phone service
with a special high tier of cable services, provided cable tax rates are
lower, or it may offer several hundred minutes of free long-distance
service with its cable offerings. Such a shift in revenues allows AT&T
to escape the high-tax jurisdiction and gain an artificial competitive
advantage. 63 Once again, regulations affect provider decisions and
consumers are made worse off because regulations are not likely to
be consistent with their best interests.
B.

Carrier Eligibility

In order for a universal service program to be consistent with the
new competitive environment it must allow a wide variety of service
62. See id., paras. 67-71.
63. If cable tax rates are higher, AT&T may simply shift revenues to phone service or
internet access.
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providers to be eligible to receive universal service support. In a
competitive market, consumers ultimately determine which service
offerings will succeed. Regulators must therefore not limit consumer
options by restricting the type of carriers that are eligible for
universal service support.64 However, because incumbent carriers
have been the sole recipients of subsidies, both implicit and explicit,
regulators are under pressure to adopt standards that favor
incumbents.
In the Universal Service Order, the Commission determined the
criteria a carrier must meet to be considered eligible to receive
universal service subsidies ("eligible carriers"). First, the Act
specifies that only telecommunications carriers may be eligible.6 5
Eligible carriers are also required to use their own facilities and must
offer service throughout the entire service area for which eligibility is
granted. 66 To fulfill the latter requirement, resale, in combination
with a carrier's own facilities, can be used.67
While state regulators will make the ultimate determination of
carrier eligibility,68 the FCC determined that a "core" set of
"designated" services must be provided to gain access to federal
subsidies. The FCC determined that a carrier must provide: "singleparty service; voice grade access to the public switched network; Dual
Tone Multifrequency ("DTMF") signaling or its functional
equivalent; access to emergency services including, in some
circumstances, access to 911 and Enhanced 911 ("E911"); access to
operator services; access to interexchange services; access to directory

64. To this end, the Joint Board recommended and the FCC adopted a principle that
the federal universal service mechanism should be competitively neutral. "Universal
service support mechanisms and rules should be competitively neutral. In this context,
competitive neutrality means the universal service support mechanisms and rules should
neither unfairly advantage nor disadvantage one provider over another, and neither
unfairly favor nor disfavor one technology over another." Universal Service Order, para.

47.
65. The Act states that "only an eligible telecommunications carrier designated under
214(e) shall be eligible to receive specific Federal universal service support." 47 U.S.C. §
254(e).
66. The 1996 Act provides that "[a] common carrier designated as an eligible
telecommunications carrier.., shall... (A) offer the services that are supported by
Federal universal service support mechanisms under 254(c), either using its own facilities
or a combination of its own facilities and resale of another carrier's services (including the
services offered by another eligible telecommunications carrier); and (B) advertise the
availability of such services and the charges therefore using media of general distribution."
47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(1).

67. See id,
68. See 47 U.S.C § 254(e).
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assistance; and toll limitation services for qualifying low-income
consumers. '69 The FCC further determined that unbundled elements
are considered a carrier's "own facilities" for purposes of being
considered an eligible carrier. 70 In order to7 receive support, carriers
must offer each of these designated services. '
In addition, the FCC concluded that a minimum level of local
usage should be supported by federal universal service mechanisms.
Carriers that do not offer a local usage component as part of their
flat-rated offerings will not be eligible for support. 72 The FCC
justifies this requirement on the basis "that universal service must
encompass the ability to use the network, including the ability to
place calls at affordable rates." 73 The FCC goes on to claim that such
a requirement is competitively neutral because the absence of such a
requirement may favor wireless over wireline technologies. The FCC
explains that because a wireline telephone system has relatively high
fixed costs with low usage costs, while a wireless network may have
moderate fixed costs but per-minute costs that are higher than
wireline networks, a local usage component is needed to be
competitively neutral. 74 The FCC concludes that unless it quantifies
an amount of local usage that must be provided without extra charges
in order to be eligible, consumers may have to pay additional perminute fees and would not receive the benefits universal service is
designed to promote.75 This reasoning, however, ignores consumer
preferences and the obvious comparative advantage wireless carriers
69. Universal Service Order, para. 56. For several of these services, e.g., single-party
service, toll blocking, and 911 or E911, the FCC allowed incumbent carriers to petition
their state commissions to permit them a period of several years to upgrade their networks
before they would be considered ineligible for support. See iL
70. Universal Service Order,para. 163.
71. See id.
72. See id. paras. 65-70.
73. Id. para. 66.
74. The absence of a requirement would be consistent with a policy of competitive
neutrality. Additionally, because incumbent carriers will remain rate regulated until
competition develops, the option of a flat-rated plan that includes a local usage component
will be guaranteed for the immediate future.
75. Universal Service Order,para. 67. In a subsequent further notice, the FCC sought
comment on this issue, asking: "whether carriers should only be eligible to receive
universal service support with respect to subscribers who select a basic service package
that include a certain amount of local usage without additional charge. Alternatively, [the
FCC sought comment] on whether carriers should only be eligible to receive universal
service support if a certain percentage of their subscribers subscribe to a basic service
package that includes a certain amount of flat-rated local usage." Federal-State Joint
Board on Universal Service, CC Docket no. 96-45, 13 F.C.C.R 21252, para. 50 (1998)
(Memorandum Opinion, Order, and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
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may have in serving customers that have little desire to make a large
number of calls. If the regulator-determined minimum level of
service exceeds consumer desires, there is room for welfare
improvement.
For example, in rural, high-cost areas, customers who make few
calls may be made better off if they are allowed to use a wireless
service with a low monthly rate and a relatively high per-minute
charge. By allowing consumers the option of choosing between a
wireline and a wireless offering, both of which are subsidized,
consumers will determine which service best matches their needs. In
a competitive environment, consumers would only choose a relatively
low-quality service, or one that had a low connection charge and high
per-minute charges, if that combination of service and price best
suited their needs. However, because regulators require a local usage
component, such an option will not be available because only plans
with local usage components will be supported.
C. Second Lines
While the Joint Board determined that only primary lines should
be supported, the FCC concluded that, at least in the near future, all
lines, including secondary lines, would continue to receive support.76
Because subsidizing non-primary wireless phones may be seen as
excessive, state regulators may not allow wireless carriers to be
eligible for subsidies. But preventing universal service subsidies to
wireless carriers distorts their ability to be primary service providers.
Recently, Western Wireless filed a petition with the FCC claiming
that the Kansas Commission has adopted eligibility standards that
favor incumbent carriers, making it very difficult for new entrants to
gain access to subsidies. 77 While we have not developed an opinion
on the merits of Western Wireless's petition, the potential for state
commissions to block the introduction of new technologies to deliver
service to rural areas frustrates the ability of markets to find the leastcost solution to the universal service problem. As discussed below,
we conclude that consumers should have the ultimate decision of
whether a company receives subsidies. This could be accomplished
76. The Joint Board recommended that support only go to primary connections, but
the FCC determined that all lines would continue to be supported until the new forwardlooking mechanism is implemented, at which time it will address this issue. See Universal

Service Order,para. 96.
77. See Western Wireless Corporation's Petition for Preemption, Pursuant to Section

253 of the Communications Act, of Kansas Statutes and Rules that Discriminate Against
New Entrants, File No. CWD 98-90 (July 20,1998).
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by relaxing the requirements a carrier must meet to become an
eligible carrier.
IV. Possible Solutions
A. Allow Choices by Consumers, Not Regulators

It is not clear whether the Act or the FCC's implementation of it
needs to be changed to give consumers the power to choose the
services they find offer the best tradeoff between quality and cost.78
The Act says subsidies must go to carriers, not consumers. Where the
payments go, however, is not as important as which services qualify
for subsidies. The Telecommunications Act requires that "[q]uality
services should be available at just, reasonable, and affordable
rates. '79 The FCC, in its implementation of the Act, determined that
this requires that only providers that meet the definition of supported
services be eligible for universal service support.80
In a setting of regulated monopoly, requiring carriers to offer
services that meet certain standards may be reasonable, but it should
not preclude them from offering alternative plans to consumers. As
long as additional offerings do not affect the price of the basic service,
consumers would only choose the alternative offering if it made them
better off. Thus, if the carrier wanted to market a lower quality
service it would have to offer the service at a discount. The same
reasoning can be applied to disbursement of universal service funds.
In the Universal Service Order, the FCC defined supported
services to be very similar to the current offerings of regulated
incumbents. 81 If the incumbent made available a new, lower quality,
offering it would not be subsidized. This makes consumers worse off.
Consumers would only choose the lower quality offering if it were
offered at a price that compensated them for the reduction in service.
Because lower quality services are not subsidized, the relative prices
of such offerings are artificially high and consumers are denied these
choices.
By broadly defining the services that qualify for support, the
FCC and state regulators could allow consumers to choose from a
78. It should be clear that the subsidy to carrier problem is not limited to high cost
customers, but also to subsidize low income consumers as well.
79. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(b).
80. Universal Service Order,para. 61.

81. As discussed above, the FCC determined that eligible carriers must offer singleparty voice-grade service that includes a local usage component. See idpara. 67.
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wide variety of telecommunications plans and pick the one that best
suits their needs. This would not only better serve customers, but also
provides the opportunity for more competition in high-cost areas.
For example, a fixed wireline service with unlimited calling would
have to compete with other similar plans, measured service offerings
of wireless carriers and, possibly lower quality (for now), IP voice
over cable systems. There would be no need for regulators to adjust
how subsidies are determined under such a regime. Prices would
reflect service quality and consumers would only choose a particular
plan if it offered them the best package for the money. Thus, carriers
would not be allowed to "pocket" the differences in cost between the
high and low-quality services, but would be forced to reduce the
prices of low-quality offerings transferring the benefits to consumers.
The size of the universal service program would be unchanged and
consumers would be better off.
Allowing a broad range of offerings, however, presents several
problems for regulators. First, The FCC determined that it would
continue to support all lines, including secondary lines. 82 Because
individual consumers may choose to subscribe to more than one
offering, and all plans would be supported, the size of the universal
service program may grow rapidly if competition leads to
differentiated offerings and consumers subscribe to multiple
offerings. A politically troubling aspect of supporting multiple
connections with broadly defined supported services is that the
universal service plan would subsidize secondary mobile phones and
voice offerings delivered over cable, which could include video. The
obvious solution to this problem is to make customers certify, much
like they choose long-distance companies, the carrier that is their
universal-service provider and limit support to a single connection. 83
This would be equivalent to giving the subsidy directly to consumers,
who would then decide which company receives the support.
Because such a plan is likely to increase the amount of
competition in rural areas, incumbent carriers will not to support it.
Rural constituents may oppose the plan because support would be
limited to a single connection. Regulators may also oppose such a
plan because increased competition would decrease government
control over the marketplace.
82. See id. para. 96.
83. The Joint Board recommended that support only go to primary connections, but
the FCC determined that all lines would continue to be supported until the new forwardlooking mechanism is implemented, at which time it will address this issue. See id.

1610

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

In addition to the pro-competitive benefits such a change could
create, this change could allow a better targeting of the subsidy to
achieve the true goal of universal service. A true universal service
program would be designed to ensure that all people have access to
telecommunications services. This implies that only those in danger
of "falling off the network" if they are forced to pay rates that reflect
costs would be subsidized. By taking the logical step of directly
subsidizing consumers, rather than companies, the system would be
truly explicit.
This would expose the fact that the current universal service
program asks low-income subscribers in low-cost, primarily urban,
areas to pay telecom taxes to subsidize customers in rural areas,
including those with substantial incomes. With the more evident
subsidies paid to subscribers, there might be additional pressure to
Supporters of universal service,
radically change the system.
The constituencies
however, do not desire such transparency.
opposing these changes would be different than those who fear
additional competition. In this case, it is the high-income people in
the rural areas and their elected representatives (who are
disproportionately represented in the Senate and especially on the
Senate Commerce Committee) who would oppose the change.
Crandal184 and Faulhaber 85 investigate why a majority of voters
might not want the efficiency enhancing effects of rate rebalancing,
where, in total, long distance rates are reduced by the amount that
offsets any increase in local rates. Essentially, they come to the same
conclusion-the skewed nature of long distance telephone demand
means that most people will pay a small amount more for overall
service if rates were rebalanced, while heavy users of long distance
will experience large savings.
B. Eliminate Separations
The second obvious change that follows from our analysis is to
eliminate separations. A unified federal and state system would
eliminate the wasteful work that is necessary to allocate common

84. R. W. Crandall, Telephone Subsidies, Income Redistribution, and Consumer
Welfare, in A COMMUNICATIONS CORNUCOPIA 400-20 (R.G. Noll and M.E. Price eds.,
1998).
85. G. R. Faulhaber, Voting on Prices: The Political Economy of Regulation, in
INTERCONNECTION AND THE INTERNET: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE 1996
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE (G. L. Rosston and D.

Waterman eds., 1997).
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between jurisdictions. 86

More

importantly,

eliminating

separations would eliminate the competitive arbitrage opportunities
they create. Once again, there is a group that would be opposed to
this. These are the federal and state regulators who would stand to
lose power. Currently, even though they share power, each has the
ability to create certain types of charges to further their own aims.
Because eliminating separations would possibly force regulators to
give up this power, neither federal nor state regulators are likely to
support such a change.
Bell Atlantic proposed a possible compromise. Instead of
continuing to examine all expenditures and categorize these into the
interstate or intrastate jurisdiction each year, Bell Atlantic proposed
that regulators should simply pick a percentage that would be applied
to all expenditures. 87 Such a solution would have to be applied to
revenue also and to competing carriers as well as to incumbent
carriers. This solution is similar to the FCC's safe harbor for wireless
carriers, where a certain percentage of wireless revenues were
determined to be interstate for purposes of paying universal service
taxes. 88
C. Get Rid of Arbitrary Service Categories

In addition to sounding the death knell for separations, a truly
efficient universal service program would do away with arbitrary
service category distinctions. Not only can there be no tax-related
differences between highly substitutable services, but regulators must
be aware of the possibility of bundled offerings. Bundling may occur
for at least two reasons - consumer demand for bundles or cost
savings associated with bundled offerings. This latter reason should
not be driven by artificial tax differences.
To ameliorate these problems would probably require significant
political changes. First, taxes would have to be assessed on a broader
scale, but it is unclear where that boundary should begin and end.
For example, if voice over cable systems is taxed, should all cable
revenues be taxed? If not, there is an incentive to shift revenues away
from the voice product and toward the other products. If so,
86. We should note that one of the authors was employed by the separations
department of a regional Bell operating company for four days before quitting in
frustration.
87. See Comments of Bell Atlantic in response to Jurisdictional Separations Reform and
Referral to the Federal-State Joint Board, CC Docket No. 80-286, filed December 10, 1997.
88. See discussion above.
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provision of voice services by cable systems is discouraged.
The logical conclusion of this is that universal service should be
funded by a general revenue tax rather than through a tax on an
artificially defined subgroup of the economy.89 Some will argue that
because of "network effects," a tax on telecommunications revenues
is justified. It is not clear, however, whether this argument is
accurate. First, with telephone penetration at 94 percent, it is unclear
that there is a large market failure that needs to be corrected.
Second, we are unaware of any estimates that measure the
importance of the network effects in telecommunications. Finally,
consumers base decisions to purchase a service based on the total
surplus they receive from it. Artificially increasing the price of
services, such as long distance, decreases the net value consumers
receive from connecting to the network.90
General revenue funding of universal service raises a couple of
questions. First, it is extremely unlikely politically. Politicians have
little desire to make the implicit telephone tax truly explicit because
this will expose its inefficiencies and inequities. 91 In particular, the
funding of high-income households is likely to come under more
pressure, increasing the number of calls to reduce the size of the
program, which threatens rural Senators. As a result, while a general
revenue tax is superior to the current implicit and narrow telephone
tax, it is unlikely to garner the necessary support. However, if the
current system is exposed and representatives of districts who are
funding the system are made aware of the amount of money
transferred to other jurisdictions, there may be a movement to reform
the current universal service program.
A more politically feasible solution, that ameliorates several of
the problems discussed above, but still requires arbitrary
determinations by regulators, is to base universal service taxes on
connections to the public switched network. While this would
eliminate a portion of the problems associated with arbitrary servicecategory and jurisdictional definitions real questions remain about
how to define a connection. For example, while it is relatively easy to
define simple voice grade connections, how would regulators go
89. See J. HAUSMAN, TAXATION BY TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION (National
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. W6260, November 1997).
90. J. Hausman et al., The Effects of the Breakup of AT&T on Telephone Penetration

in the United States, 83 AM. ECON. REV., May 1993 at 178-84.
91. Even though the Act requires that all subsidies be made explicit, there was a
significant political uproar when AT&T and MCI attempted to make their direct
contributions explicit line items on end user telephone bills.
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about defining connections using more advanced services, such as
digital subscriber loops that provide more than one voice path to the
switched network. Another problem arises with determining the
number of connections associated with dedicated access for customer
premise equipment, such as private branch exchanges. Thus, while
taxing connections will eliminate artificial interstate and intrastate
distinctions, arbitrary definitions of what constitutes a connection
would likely lead to arbitrage opportunities as digital technology and
compression increase the number of paths to the network through a
single connection.
D. Investigate Auctions
One additional solution that should be investigated is the use of
auctions.
Essentially, regulatory authorities could conduct a
procurement auction to determine the amount firms are willing to
accept to offer a detailed set of services (e.g., dial tone, minimum
quality of service, a certain amount of local calling, access to long
distance, with the same caveats discussed above to ensure the
requirements as minimally intrusive as possible). In the simplest case,
a firm might submit a bid saying it is willing to serve all customers in a
given area for $50 per month. If regulators determined that these
customers should pay no more than $30 per month for the supported
services, the firm would be given a subsidy of $20 per month, per
subscriber. The firm would take into account all of the profits it could
garner from the customer from additional services (if it could provide
voice mail, long distance, etc.) when making its bid. For example, the
firm may find that it would cost $60 to provide the supported services,
but they expect $10 in profits from other services so they would be
willing to provide the supported services for $50 per subscriber. In
this way, the marketplace would determine the amount necessary to
provide service to the customers in the area.
There are some complications that must be addressed, however,
before auctions could be used for universal service. The bidding
system described above assumes that there is competition in the
bidding and that winners obtain the exclusive right to service the area,
at least to receive the subsidy. A number of firms have proposed to
the FCC more complex methodologies that attempt to address these
problems. 92 These proposals attempt to create procurement auctions
92. See, e.g., ex parte presentation of Paul Milgrom on behalf of GTE Services Corp.,
March 19, 1997; ex parte presentation of Jeremy Bulow and Barry Nalebuff on behalf of
Ameritech Corp, March 19, 1997; ex parte presentation of Alfred Kahn and Timothy
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without exclusivity that still provides bidders with the incentive to
minimize the amount of subsidy required.
While GTE and others have been pushing these ideas for more
than two years, there has been little progress made at the FCC or in
state regulatory proceedings. This may be because of a limited
constituency, or lack of perceived interest at the FCC. The FCC has
devoted significant resources and some of their brightest economists
to the effort to modify cost models. This has so far been an incredibly
time consuming and resource-intensive process. If the FCC were to
devote resources to the auction, it might be perceived as a lack of
confidence in the cost model process, even though many auction
proposals rely on cost models to set maximum subsidies. Also, firms
may not want to lobby heavily for auctions because they fear this will
be perceived as an effort to undermine the FCC's cost-modeling
efforts. Finally, if the auctions were to work as efficiently as one
would hope, the rents from serving high cost areas would be reduced
and firms serving high-cost areas would oppose such a proposal.
Auctions may provide an alternative that not only uses
marketplace competition to determine subsidies and efficient
provision of services, but they also may provide a mechanism to
reduce the level of the subsidies that are absent from any other
universal service program currently under consideration.
Conclusion
Universal service is an arena ripe for policy change. Regardless
of one's views on the efficacy of universal service, these policies will
have a large effect on the development and efficiency of
telecommunications markets. As we have discussed, universal service
has been used to justify economically irrational pricing policies that
affect virtually every aspect of telecommunications regulation. Thus,
implementation of the new universal service programs will have
widespread effects on the marketplace. Contrary to other times in
the history of telecommunications regulation, widespread entry into
local markets, which will eat away at any remaining cross subsidies, is
allowed. Regulators' insistence to rely on irrational pricing schemes
is not sustainable under the new competitive regime. Because of the
large amount of money at stake, universal service programs will have
a large impact on carriers' decisions of which markets to enter, the
services to provide and how to market their services. Regulators
Tardiff on behalf of US West, March 19, 1997.
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must therefore be keenly aware of the effects their regulations have
on carrier incentives to make sure that market forces, not their rules,
determine how consumers will be served.
There are two basic paths regulators may follow to minimize the
effects of their universal service policies. They can either reduce the
amount of money at stake or make it difficult for carriers to take
advantage of any regulatory-induced arbitrage opportunities that
arise. We have attempted to identify several of the problems
regulators will encounter if they attempt to minimize the distortions a
universal service program will inevitably create and the political
difficulties associated with our proposals. In essence, these are
temporary fixes. While it may not be feasible in the immediate
future, a long-term solution is to develop a true low-cost universal
service program designed to keep people on the network. In the
interim, regulators should be considering how best to ratchet down
the size of the program over time. When adopting the new program,
regulators should include a clear framework that details how the size
of the fund will be reduced over time as new technologies are adopted
and the cost of providing service falls. A better solution economically
would be to fund the program explicitly through non-distortionary
taxes, but such a program is unlikely to pass political muster in
today's climate. 93
Universal service is not unique in the problems it presents.
There is a lot of money at stake, which gives companies the incentive
to position themselves to minimize their payments and maximize
their payouts. Politicians, whose constituents benefit the most from
universal service will be vocal, while those whose constituents lose
out under the program are unlikely to oppose it vigorously because
the costs are not visible and are spread out over a large number of
voters.
Changing technologies, the introduction of competition and an
of
future
the
makes
landscape
uncertain regulatory
telecommunications markets highly uncertain. Regulators are in the
difficult position of trying to write rules that not only foster efficient
outcomes but must also attempt to fulfill the social goals associated
with the Act's universal service requirements. This must be done
under a dual-jurisdictional framework where the goals of state and
federal regulators are not always aligned. Given these difficulties,
93. In fact, during the writing of this article, Senator Stevens of Alaska, a state that
benefits from generous funding for high cost areas, said that he opposed a proposal for
specific line items on consumers' bills. See NECA WASHINGTON WATCH, 3/26/99.
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regulators must be aware that their rules will have a large impact on
carrier incentives. As regulators write rules, firms will seek to take
advantage of those rules.
Regulators should understand the
competitive effects of their decisions as well as the goals that they
claim to be trying to achieve.

